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WHAT'S THE POINT OF A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY?*
Amartya Sen
Abstract
Standard indicators of economic success leave out many aspects
of development that are crucial to the well-being and freedom of
citizens. We have to examine critically the ends as well as the
means involved in development strategies. The impact of public
education, health care, social security, etc. have to be seen
both in terms of their direct effects on human capabilities and
their indirect consequences on people's lives through raising
productivity and earning powers, and through helping to reduce
the burden, especially on young women, of high fertility. The
two aspects have to be considered together.
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WHAT'S THE POINT OF A DEVELOPMENTSTRATEGY?
1. Introduction
Is "development strategy" a smart thing to have? It looked like
that when development economics was born as a new subject in the
late 1940s. A state could do wonders, it seemed, with a well
thought out design of development. Many economists - Ragnar
Nurkse (1953), w. Arthur Lewis (1955), Paul Baran (1957), Harvey
Leibenstein (1957), Jan Tinbergen (1958), Charles Kindleberger
(1958), among others - outlined their respective ways of getting
development going and making things more rapid. There were, of
course, sceptics too, such as Albert Hirschman (1958), who saw
development as a less planned and more spontaneous process, often
emerging from undesigned chaos rather than from designed order.
But the balance of opinion in the circle of development
economists was very definitely on the side of "strategists"
rather than "anti-strategists.'"
Things have moved on from there. Views have changed. The faith
in the government's ability to do good things has dwindled. The
increased appreciation of the role of markets rather than of
governments also tertds to make the reliance on public policy and
development strategy deeply suspect. Indeed, development
strategy has ceased to be a very attractive term. It is often
seen as the airing of Napoleonic ambitions by a bureaucracy with
a solid record of bungling, blundering and botching.
Perhaps the most
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We must examine and scrutinize the rationale underlying the
search for a sensible "development strategy." This rationale can
be examined at different levels. The focus of this paper is on
the welfare-economic issues underlying the subject. The implicit
priorities of an "unfettered" system of market-based growth can
involve serious neglect of significant human ends to which we
have reason to attach importance. However, in arguing for a
departure, we have to identify what these neglects are, why they
arise, and how they may be addressed in the choice of a
development strategy.
2. Public policy and Development strateav
The need for a development strategy can be denied at two
rather different levels. First, it could be argued that public
policies, in general, do not actually facilitate economic
development. Perhaps the government could do better by letting
well alone, and by permitting people to pursue their private
gains, without let or hindrance. The point is also made that the
rich countries today were once poor too, and managed to achieve
development without any fancy public policy for economic
development.2 Why can't the poor countries today do much the
same?
Second, even if it is thought that there is a reasonable
case for having ~ public policies for economic development,
See Bauer (1972, 1991). Albert Hirschman's (1958)
scepticism, to which reference was made earlier, did not,
however, follow this route. His doubts applied to relying on the
market and not just to relying on the government, and he pointed
to complex social and political factors that are influential in
the process of development.
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it could be doubted that these policies should take the form of
some great design that the government should try to impose on the
economy. The doubt here is not about the need for public policy,
but about having it in so grand a form that it could be called,
without blushing, "a development strategy." An alternative would
be to leave matters to rational microeconomic evaluation and to
cost-benefit analysis of projects, and then to accept whatever
overall pattern results from such evaluation and analysis.
Scepticism of "development strategy" can combine well with an
affirmative belief in governmental cost-benefit analysis (well
illustrated by the classic "manual" of project appraisal by Ian
Little and James Mirrlees 1968).3
These sceptical questions are important to address. In
responding to them, it is useful to note that a development
strategy need not be particularly despotic, nor be a very grand
and neatly designed scheme. It is mainly a question of what a
government can sensibly do on a systematic basis, and what
approach it should take in deciding on what it can sensibly do.
In this context some points seem obvious enough.
First, what is the alternative? What would it be like to
have no development strategy at all? No state can exist in a
policy vacuum, and public policy in one form or another is
inescapable (even if it only takes the shape of governmental non-
interference). Even the rallying cry for more "free trade" in
radical Manchester was a demand for a particular type of public
policy - indeed for a specific type of "development strategy" -
3 See also Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972) and Dreze and
Stern (1987).
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different from what was then in vogue. Adam Smith's (1776)
Wealth of Nations outlines such a strategic departure in some
detail.
Second, even the flourishing of profit-seeking private
enterprises turns on an established set up of law and order.
Indeed, big differences were made in the history of early
economic development precisely by governmental machinery that
provided the security and stability so strongly needed for
efficient and confident functioning of business enterprises.
Even if there were no room for positive state activities in
promoting economic development, there would surely be some need
for the supportive strategy of curbing economic insecurity
related to the usurping, commandeering or vandalizing of useful
assets and endowments.
Third, as a matter of fact, positive state activities have
played quite a considerable part in the historical process of
economic development. This applies even to the early economic
development in Europe and America, not to mention the later
experiences of Japan, and more recently, east Asia, where the
state has been very actively present in assisting industrial
development (for example, in Korea).' This has happened not only
through deliberate patronage of particular types of economic
activities (sometimes initially through protection and then
through assisting exports, combined with cheaper finance, as in
South Korea), but also through providing suitable social and
· On different aspects
Hong and Krueger (1975),
(1993a), and World Bank
references cited there.
of public policy in South Korea, see
Amsden (1989), Birdsall and Sabot
(1993), McGuire (1995), and the
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economic preparation for the seizing of economic opportunities
by people (for example, through the spread of literacy and
education, land reforms, and so on, as in Japan and much of east
Asia).' The question does arise as to what we have learnt from
these experiences, and what should the developing countries today
do to profit from the lessons of these earlier episodes of
policies and strategies.
Fourth, in addition to favouring general economic
development, any responsible state has to consider issues of
equity and disparity. Even very fast economic development can
neglect some people, while others do extremely well, and there
is no escape from encountering distributional issues. How the
distributional problems are to be tackled by the state, the civil
society and social groups remains an important question, but the
concern for social justice cannot be brushed aside in thinking
about the promotion of economic development.
Finally, there are important questions of ends and means in
deciding on the concept of development. Even though it is quite
conventional to think of development primarily in terms of the
, Institutional reform, of which land reform is a pre-
eminent example, is an important aspect of public policy for
development. The underlying issues are discussed in Stiglitz and
Mathewson (1986), Stiglitz (1988), Bardhan (1989), Stern (1989),
Basu (1990), among other contributions. Another policy area
relates to public policies that help to generate and sustain
competition; on the importance of this factor in Japanese
economic development, see Suzumura (1995).
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growth of GNP per head, there is need to think about what all
this is for. This involves a scrutiny of ideas and strategies
of developmentat a conceptual level. Wecannot escape asking
what criteria of development should guide our policies and
strategies. This issue is pursued further in the next section. achievement is sometimes called). However, in making comparisons
of achievements of different individuals or different
3. Welfare Economics. Development and Social Choice
Traditional welfare economics is founded on the principle
communities, relying only on comparative holdings of commodities
of assessing states and decisions in terms of individual
and their aggregate valuations in terms of "real income" can be
preferences and values. Preferences can be seen rather narrowly
as the desires that guide our day-to-day choices in markets (for
very deceptive. Much would depend on other factors that
example, when we buy commodity bundles for personal use according
to our taste), or in very broad terms (including, inter alia, the
role of individuals as citizens deciding on the kind of society
we would like to have). While there is a strong case for using
the broadly-defined preferences as the basis of public judgments
and decisions (on this see Arrow 1951), traditional welfare
influence the parametrically variable correspondences between
real incomes and individual achievements (and between commodity
holdings and the capability to achieve).'
The relationship between commodities owned and the lives
that people can lead may vary with individual circumstances (such
as age, disability, proneness to illness, etc.) as well as social
Furthermore, given the fact that "utility functions" based
conditions (such as epidemiological situations, prevalence of
crime, availability of social services, etc.).7
variations in social conditions is particularly relevant for
public policies, since they not only influence real incomes, but
also the conversion of real incomes into good living conditions.
Comparisons of real incomes can, thus, be very deceptive in
economics has typically focused on narrower characterization of
preferences.
even on these narrow preferences are hard to identify in
practice, standard welfare-economic analysis has tended to
examining the quality of life - indeed even the "quantity" of
concentrate on market valuation of commodity holdings in
assessing individual preference-fulfilment and also social
life in the sense of longevity. It can, for example, be shown
welfare. The result has been the practice of judging economic
that compared with the people of China, sri Lanka, or the Indian
state of Kerala, the inhabitants of the Harlem district of the
success and failure in terms of movements of "real income" -
prosperous city of New York have systematically lower chances of
representing the valuation of commodities produced or consumed
at constant prices - prices that reflect conditions in the market
(or as it would be in some appropriately imagined market).
Indeed, for an individual with given preference, there is
The assumptions that would remove this parametric
variability (making the commoditybasis of real income more
cogent for judging well-being) are identified and examinedin Sen
(1979, 1985).
a functional relation here which can take us from comparative
statements in the commodity space to those in the space of
7 There can also be variations related to natural conditions
such as the physical climate, or the likelihood of cyclones and
flooding (over and above the influence that these factors can
have on the volume of commodity production and the size of real
incomes).achievements (or "utilities", as the generic indicator of
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surviving to a ripe, old age. So do African Americans in general
in the united States; see Chart 1.8 And yet the residents of
Harlem and African Americans generally have incomparably higher
VariationsIn
Male Sul\'ival
Ratesby Sex
and Regionlevels of real income per head than the average Chinese, Sri
Lankan or Keralite. The differences in achievements of survival
rates relate to factors other than personal incomes, such as the
nature of elementary health care, the opportunities of basic
education, the preservation of local peace and order, the role
of family life, and so on. These factors too are influenced by
development strategies, and it would be, thus, a mistake to make
the strategy of development relate only to the enhancement of
real incomes.
To take another example to illustrate this point, consider
the decadal growth of real gross domestic product per capita in
the U.K. for each of the first six decades of this century, and
also the decadal increases in life expectancy at birth for each
of these six decades. Chart 2 present the two sets of figures,
and they are, to say the least, not close." Even if the argument
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were to be made that life expectancy is ultimately dependent
mainly on GDP per head with a decadal laq (a hypothesis that is
not contradicted by this chart, but does not stand up well to
further critical examination), we must still accept that the
growth experiences of the respective decades are quite different
See Sen (1993), which also discusses the sources of data
and the methods used. _ sa5cft.A..
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" See Table 10.2 in Dreze and Sen (1989), which also gives
the sources of data. The relevance of this comparative picture
is also discussed in my oral presentation at the International
Economic Association Round-table Conference on "economic growth";
see pasinetti and Solow (1994), pp. 363-8.
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CHART 2 depending on the variable on which we choose to focus (whether
a decade should be classified as "high growth" or "low growth"
would depend on whether we are looking at the growth of GDP per
head, or expansion of life expectancy).
In fact, there are other ways of explaining the variations
in life expectancy. There is much evidence that the big upward
jumps in life expectancy in Britain during the decades of 1911-21
and 1940-51 were connected with the increased use of public
distribution of food and health care in the war years, related
8 0.4 partly to the culture of sharing during those beleaguered
times. 10 Indeed, even though the average quantity of food
7 0.3
consumed in Britain during the war years fell significantly,
6 cases of acute undernourishment virtually disappeared in the same
period, because of the guaranteeing of minimal nutrition through
public distribution systems.11 Also, a better sharing of health
5
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o care in this period made a contribution to this, along with its
role in the ultimate emergenceof the National Health Service in3
~~.1
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2 the latter part of the decade of the 1940s. Public health and
nutritional care are also "economic" matters, and since they do
influence the variables that make a difference, why should that
part of the story not come into the choice of development
",
strategy, going well beyond the pursuit of fast economic growth?
Our interest in the well-being and quality of life of the
people can scarcely be brushed aside in favour of no-nonsense
10 On this see Dreze and Sen (1989), Chapter 10, and the
literature discussed there.
11 See the references cited in Dreze and Sen (1989), in
particular Hammond(1951). On this general issue, see also
Winter (1986).
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growth of GNP per capita, and that immediately calls for
discussion of development strategies. This is inescapably
may even be in conflict with the "quantity" of living that a
person does, since old age can be uncomfortable and painful. The
value to be attached to additional years of life would tend to
vary with the actual age, and also must be put against other
aspects of human life, and all this calls for serious judgments
by people as citizens. The same applies to other social goals,
such as giving priority to the removal of poverty, or the social
commitment to preserve the environment.
Open discussion on public policies and governmental
strategies remain crucial even in a world that is increasingly
doubtful about bureaucracy and the ability of the state to be
valuational. Normative questions also arise in many other
contexts, for example, concerning the protection of the
environment and the safeguardingof the interests of those not
yet here. There are irreducible elements of "social choice" in
all these exercises. 12
The nature of development strategies relates ultimately to
the public evaluation of ends as well as the assessment of
economic and social means. The case for seeing preferences in
the broader form is particularlyimportant in this context. We
have to discuss what priorities to attach to different goals.
For example, there may be much general agreement that raising
efficient and useful.14 Policy alternatives have to be
life expectancy is terribly important when it is very low, but
scrutinized and social opportunities have to be assessed, and
ultimately the market as well as the government has to stand the
test of democratic critique. 15 Scepticism of governance is not
ground enough for limiting public participation only to the
market.
it may not be seen as a top priority when people live very long
anyway.13 In the latter context, the focus on "quality" of life
12 The theory of social choice had its origin in the
systematic work done by French mathematicians in the eighteenth
century, led by Condorcet and Borda, on social or group
decisions. They were concerned with processes of election and
the derivation of agreed decisions despite differences in
preferences and interests. Over the last half a century, quite
an extensive technical literature has developed in this field,
following the pioneering work of Kenneth Arrow (1951); see also
Sen (1970, 1986), and Suzumura (1983). The subject of public
participation in social decisions belongs solidly to this field,
and a number of technical results have clear bearing on what is
or is not possible to do in arriving at acceptable decisions
despite differences in interests and judgements.
13 There is no need to assume "linearity" of a kind that
would rule out variable weights on longevity, even though some
rough and ready indicators (such as the HumanDevelopment Index
of the UNDP 1990) have taken that simple route. The focus on
longevity makes much more sense for countries with low life
expectancy and high mortality rates at lower age groups. It must
not, however, be assumed that for the rich countries in general,
the problem of years of living is no longer a serious concern.
It can be an especially serious issue when dealing with
4. Human Seines as Means and Ends
In recent years there has been a significant transformation
in the analysis of economic growth and development in terms of
inequalities within the rich countries, for example, between
blacks and whites in the US, or even between the south and the
north in Italy. However, the importance of life expectancy is
clearly more central for low-longevity countries than for long-
lived nations.
14 Systematic availability of information is very important
for public discussion, and the broadening of evaluative concerns
calls for regular reporting on phenomena in which citizens have
reason to be interested. For example, Atkinson (1996) has
cogently discussed "why we need an official poverty report."
15 On this general question see Nicholas Stern (1989).
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much greater recognition of the role of what is called "human
capital", as opposed to physical capital. This is, in manyways,
a return to an earlier approach to economic development - an
and innovative idea - seems to have come much to terms with the
new lionizing of human capital in the process of development.1.
There is much to appreciate here, but we have to ask whether
approach championed particularly by Adam Smith's (1776) Wealth
of Nations. The focusing on the development of humanability and
the recognition of the role of "human capital" is adequate for
understanding the importance of human beings in the process of
competence, and the emphasis on exchange and on economies of development. If development is seen as the expansion of the
scale in supporting skill formation, were among the central
points of departure in Smith's analysis of the expansion of the
wealth of nations. That perspective was rather neglected in the
early models in the post-world-war revival of growth theory, for
example, in the so-called Harrod-Domar model, and even in early
neoclassical analysis of the process of growth and trade (often
capability of people to do the things they have reason to value
and choose, the glorification of human beings as "instruments"
of economic development cannot really be adequate.1> There is a
crucial difference here between means and ends.20 Seeing human
in very Ricardian lines)." However, more recent works give more
qualities in terms of their importance in promoting and
sustaining economic growth, significant as it is, tells us
nothing about why economicgrowth is sought in the first place,
nor muchabout the role of enhancedhumanqualities in making itrecognition to the far-reaching role of human skill, and they
have had the effect of re-establishing an old tradition that had directly possible for us to lead freer and more f1,1lfilling
been temporarily overshadowed.1' lives.21
economies and increasingly of some south-east Asian economies
If we take instead a less partial view of human beings in
the process of development, we have to note that an expansion of
health care, eduction, or social security must directly count as
"developmental", since they help us to lead longer, freer, and
more fruitful lives, whether or not that expansion also increases
By now there is fairly abundant acknowledgementof the
importance of humancapital in economicdevelopment. The typical
readings of the experiences of the more successful east Asian
as well - have tended to put a lot of emphasis on this causal
influence in the process of achievement of these countries. Even
the World Bank - not invariably the quickest to notice a fresh
1. See especially the World Bank (1993).
1> This issue is discussed in Sen (1985).
20 On this see also Anand and Ravallion (1993), Nussbaum and
Sen (1993), Desai (1995), among other writings.16 However, one of the most influential findings of neo-
classical growth theory was Robert Solow's (1956) identification
of how much remained to be explained, within the interpretative
structure of that theory, after taking full note of the
accumulation of capital and labour.
17See, for example, Romer (1987), Lucas (1988), Helpman and
Krugman (1990). See also Jorgenson (1995).
21 There is some evidence that the effectiveness of economic
growth in expanding such basic achievements as longevity depends
on particular aspects of the economic expansion, such as the
increase in income going to the poorest sections and expansion
of public heal th services; on this see Anand and Ravallion
(1993) .
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labour productivity or the actual production of commodities concerns.
(reflected in such indicators as the GNP). when human There certainly is no escape from making explicit value
development is seen in this broader way, the direct impact (on
human welfare and freedom) of public activities in health,
judgments on the relative importance of various aspects of
quality of life, or of the relative importance of various basic
capabilities. But are such value judgments absent in using the
GNP or the real income? Wemust distinguish between (1) the
availability of externally given weights to calculate the GNP,
and (2) taking those weights to be appropriate in iudqinq
education, etc., has to be taken into account, in addition to
seeing their role in the formation and use of human capital, in
terms of raising productivities and expanding actual commodity
productions.22 Indeed, even as far the expansion of commodity
productions is concerned, it has to be borne in mind that they
are valued, ultimately, not for their own sake, but as means to
development, or in evaluatinq the economic or social progress of
a nation. Just because the former is simply qiven to us to
human welfare and freedom.
In this context, it is important to discuss some fears that
are understandably aired about "broadening" the criteria of
success and failure. The constituent elements of quality of life
are diverse, and there is no escape from the problem of relative
valuation. In comparison, the use of such standard indicators
as GNP per head may seem unproblematic. While there is also a
problem of "weighting" of different commodities, it has been
pointed out that there is "an operational metric for weighting
an evaluative judgment is inescapable in this exercise, and
anyone who values public scrutiny must be under some obligation
to make clear that a judgment is being made in using the GNP (and
the weights implicitly present in its construction).
For example, the GNP puts the sameweight on each dollar of
a person in great poverty as it does on every dollar of a
commodities the metric of exchange value. "23 Important millionaire. It also puts a zero weight - not any more than that
- on the length of life and the level of education, qiven thequestions have been raised about whether a broadening of focus
to take note of the achievement of some basic quality of life (or
of the enhancement of humancapability to live longer and better)
would be "operational," and it has often been pointed out that
value judgments would have to be made in accommodating such
level of GNP per head. Rather than brushing the whole issue
under the carpet of a technical definition of somethinq else (as
many devotees of the GNP do, as if a technical definition of an
23 See Sugden (1993), p. 239; see also Srinivasan (1994).
2. Even this is not fully the case, since the "base" prices
have to be selected for constant-price comparisons. Also the
prices and marketing conditions can vary with neighbourhoods and
communities, even within a given country (on the importance of
taking note of such variations for welfare-economic analysis, see
Atkinson 1995).
22 On this question, see Sen (1980, 1985), Streeten et al
(1981), Stewart (1985), Dreze and Sen (1989), UNDP (1990), among
other writings.
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calculate market values (in the form of "the metric of exchange
value") ,
2. it does not follow that we must find those very
weights to be just right for judging development. The need for
exchange-value metric gives it automatically an evaluative world countries would be seen as a matter of serious concern by
development requires inevitably an evaluative judgement. The
many, and this concern cannot be made to disappear simply by
pointing to the alleged "operational" advantage of relying
exclusively on income per head because they generate a complete
order. The central issue is how far we can go on the basis of
widely agreed judgments to arrive at some policy guidance, and
it is this problem of practical reason that has to be our basic
status), we can explicitly present social judgments based on
broader concerns, which can then be subjected to discussion and
debate. As an approach it is much more open to public scrutiny.
This is appropriate since the use of any indicator in judging
GNP, which is not particularly plausible as an indicator of
development (or of the quality of life), does this implicitly,
and its ability to get away with its severe imperfections (as an
evaluative indicator) has much to do with this implicitness.
concern.
In any choice of criteria for evaluative purposes, there
would not only be value judgments, but also some that many would
question. This is inescapable in the making of public policy,
and the real issue is whether we can use criteria that would have
5. Benefits and Costs of Social Development
In the light of the preceding discussion, it is useful to
distinguish between two types of influences of social development
(education, heal th care, etc. ) through expanding human
purposes. If we do not insist on completeness, substantial
capabilities:
(1) a direct impact of these social programmes in expanding
personal capabilities and in enhancing well-being and
effective freedom;
greater public support than the use of GNP alone, for evaluative
agreements can be found around some specific judgments. Also, (2) an indirect impact that works through raising
the process of public discussion and interaction can generate
limited consensus which can be the basis of public policy.2s
productivities and incomes, with the increases in real
The thing to look for is not some grand "social objective
function" which generates a complete ordering of all alternative
incomes serving to expand capabilities and well-being
further.2'
social states, but the presence of sufficient agreement that
The traditional use of human capital tends to concentrate on the
second (particularly, income generation), which is important
points to partial orderings based on agreed priorities (on this
see Sen 1970, 1995). The fact that the American blacks have a
lower chance of surviving to an older age than do the immensely
poorer - in terms of income per head - population of many third-
2S On this see particularly Knight (1947) and Buchanan
(1954, 1986).
2. Another "indirect" effect (involving a different type of
instrumental role) of social development relates to the impact
of health care and of basic education (especially of women) on
fertility rates; on this see Dreze and Sen (1995) and the
literature cited there.
16 17
enough.27 But it needs supplementation by the first - "direct" - in power and authority within the household.30 Thus, the
process. The broadening that is needed is, in this sense, indirect route may involve several distinct steps, but the
overall result for women (in particular, greater economic
opportunity and independence, on the one hand, and a better
additional and cumulative, rather than being an alternative to
the "human capital" perspective.
This broader view of human development also permits us to
include the far-reaching distributional impacts of expansion of
education and health care that are lost in the aggregative
relative position within the household, on the other) can very
powerfully reinforce the gain that is directly made in the
welfare and freedom of women because of better health and more
perspectives. Expansion of education, especially at the most
basic level, can act as a major force in the direction of
generating economic eaualitv, in addition to its immediate role
educated living.
In addition to these considerations, attention must also be
paid to the impact of health, education, and other social
in enhancing educational eaualitv itself.28 Nutritional achievements on fertility behaviour, in assessing the role of
improvements can also influence productivity and earning power."
Such distributional considerations apply to differentiations
not only according to class, community and location, but also to
human development. Since frequent child bearing tends to have
the most immediately adverse impact on the lives of young women,
gender inequalities. Indeed, greater education and health
one effect of greater gender equality is to is to reduce the
fertility rate sharply. This has been observed extensively in
opportunities can make women's lives both directly richer and
also substantially expand their ability to seek and find
inter-country comparisons.31
employment and income. Furthermore, greater economic
The same relationship has also emerged very clearly in the
inter-district contrasts within India, which has been extensively
investigated recently by Mamta Murthi, Catherine Guio and Jean
Dreze (1995). Whenthe comparative statistics from the different
districts of India are analyzed, it turns out that among all the
independence of womencan, in its turn, also reduce inequalities
21 For example, in the 1995 World Development Report of the
World Bank, there is plenty of emphasis on "the skills and
capabilities of workers," but almost entirely in the context of
commodity production and income earning.
28 For empirical analysis related to the Asian experience,
see Mingat (1995), Gertler (1995), Ishi (1995). See also the
case studies of Japan, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and
others. For a general discussion of the underlying approach, see
also the discussion of "growth-mediated" development processes
in Dreze and Sen (1989).
2. See Bliss and Stern (1978), Dasgupta and Ray (1987,
1988), Osmani (1992), Dasgupta (1993).
usual candidates for causal influence, the onIv ones that are
30 This last connection has been analyzed in Sen (1990,
1992). Land ownership can also be an important factor in this;
see Agarwal (1995).
31 See the set of papers in Lindahl-Kiessling and Landberg
(1994), especially the articles of Nancy Birdsall and Robert
Willis which take up this issue. See also Easterlin (1980),
Schultz (1981), Birdsall (1988), Barro and Lee (1993), Dasgupta
(1993), Cassen (1994), Gita Sen et al (1994), among other
contributions.
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seen to have a statistically significant effect in reducing of "social development", broadly speaking, within a development
fertility are (1) female literacy, and (2) female labour-force strategy, since these "social" factors are often neglected in
economic analysis. The point, however, is sometimes madethatparticipation. '2 The importance of social and economic freedom
of women emerges forcefully from this analysis, especially in a poor country cannot afford much expenditure on social
comparison with the weaker effects of variables relating to
economic development on its own.
In terms of the Murthi-Guio-Dreze analysis, economic
development because of lack of resources, and for this reason
priority has to be given to economic development first - to build
up the resources.
development may be far from "the best contraceptive" that it is Is this argument sound? I do not believe it is, for three
sometimes described as. On the other hand, social development - distinct reasons. First, as has been already discussed, social
development can be very crucial for enhancing economic
development too, so that it is not a question of choosing one or
especially women's education and employment- can be very
effective indeed. Many of the richest Indian districts in, say"
Punjab and Haryana have very muchhiqher fertility rates than'the
southern districts with much lower per capita income but with
the other, nor of deciding which to do first.
integrate the analyses of development strategies.
We need to
much higher female literacy and female job opportunities.
Indeed, in this inter-district comparative picture, the level of
real incomeper capita has almost no impact (once the effects of
female education and female employment are already accounted),
compared with the sharp and effective difference made by women's
Second, even when a country is poor, there is a need to
worry about the welfare and freedom of the individual members of
the society. Indeed, these concerns may be even more acutely
education and women's economic independence. The importance of
important when people are generally poor and deprived.
Preventing terrible deprivation is not a luxury that can be
easily postponed.
social development, particularly in promoting gender equality, Third, when an economy is poor, its labour costs are lower
fertility-Iow-mortality society.
I have been paying particular attention to the importance
too, and so are t~~ real expenses of providing some of the basic
social services, including elementary education and health care,
can thus be crucial in the demographic transition to a low-
which are highly labour intensive activities. 33 Indeed, this
explains how poor economies with committed governmentshave been
'2 Murthi, Guio and Dreze (1995). The data they use relate
to 1981, which is the last year for which adequately detailed
statistics are available (from the 1981 census). The 296
districts covered in this study are all the ones from the 14
major states for which data were available; the state of Assam
missed out on the census of 1981 because of political turmoil.
Those 14 states account for 94 percent of the total population
of India.
able to carry out quite ambitious programmes of social
development, including broad provisioning of health care and
basic education. Cost-benefit analysis of social developmenthas
3' This issue is discussed in Dreze and Sen (1989).
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also the comparatively lower economic costs of having these
suggests that sharp stabilization from high inflation brings very
strong positive growth effects over even the short to medium
to take note not only of the benefits of social programmes but
programmes. run. 11]4 But Bruno also finds that "the growth effects of
6. Financial Prudence and Development strateav
The point of noting the lower economic costs of social
inflation are at best obscure at low rates of inflation (less
than 15-20 percent annually)", and goes on to ask the question:
"why worry about low rates of inflation, especially if the costs
of anticipated inflation can be avoided (by indexation) and those
of unanticipated inflation seem to be low?" (Bruno 1995, pp. 7-
development in the poorer countries is not at all to dismiss the
concern for financial prudence in early stages of development -
far from it. The need for financial carefulness is a different
8) .
issue altogether. The relatively low cost of social programmes
at the early stages of development is a factor to be taken into
account in assessing costs and benefits of different development
The real problem, in Bruno's analysis, lies in the fact that
"inflation is an inherently persistent process and, moreover, the
degree of persistence tends to increase with the rate of
strategies, but it is not an invitation to ignore the general
inflation." Bruno makes the lesson graphic with an analogy:
constraints on resource allocation.
We may however ask: why is financial prudence so important
"chronic inflation tends to resemble smoking: once you [are]
beyond a minimal number it is very difficult to escape a
for determining development strategies anyway? The answer
worsening addiction." In fact, "when shocks occur (e. g. a
relates to the likely effects of financial overspending. The
macroeconomic stability. The case for financial conservatism
personal crisis for a smoker, a price crisis for an economy)
there is great chance that the severity of the habit will jump
to a new, higher level that persists even after the shock has
abated," and this process can repeat itself (BrUno 1995, pp. 8,
basic issue to be faced is the consequential importance of
lies in the recognition that immoderate inflation brought on by
fiscal indulgence and irresponsibility can extract a heavy price
56) .
on the real economy.
The case for financial prudence must not, however, be
In an illuminating critical survey of international
experiences in this area, Michael Bruno (1995) notes that
"several recorded episodes of moderate inflation (20-40 percent
[price rise per year]) and most instances of higher rates of
inflation (of which there have been a substantial number) suggest
that high inflation goes together with significant negative
identified with the demand for what I would call "anti-deficit
radicalism", which is often confused with financial conservatism.
growth effects." And "conversely, the cumulative evidence
34 See Bruno (1995) 's Baffi Lecture at the Bank of Italy pp.
7-8.
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deficits and their inflationary impacts against the sacrifices
giving adequate recognition to the far-reaching importance of
social development. Financial prudence demands that we must take
note both of (1) the identified economic costs of budget deficits
and their likely inflationary implications, and (2) long-run
risks of macro-economic instability, and that can be done in
The case made is not for eliminating budget deficit altogether.3'
Nor indeed is it for getting to zero inflation at any cost -
irrespective of what has to be sacrificed for that end. Rather,
the lesson is to keep in view the likely costs of tolerating
that have to be made in eliminating deficits. 36 The critical
issue is to avoid the dynamic instability that even seemingly
moderate and stable inflation may have, if it is above a low
figure. hat has to be avoided is not just hiqh inflation, but -
because of dynamic instability - even moderate inflation. But
assessing alternative choices of development strategies, paying
full attention to the direct as well as indirect effects of
social development, in terms of their overall impact in enhancing
the lives of people. The costs associated with the budget
of financial prudence.
In arriving at development strategies, it is necessary to
constraint will apply to all alternative avenues of public
spending, and the case for social development has to meet that
test of doing comparatively well.
The point of "development strategy" must not be seen as
evading comparative scrutiny in resource allocation. But it is
possible to get useful indications of likely directions of
success by looking at the history of economic development.
Perhaps the most important "strategic" lesson that has emerged
from the type of success that the east Asian economies have had -
beginning with Japan - is the importance of social development
both in facilitating economic growth and in directly raising the
quality of life. All these economies went comparatively early
for massive expansion of education, and later also of health
care, and this they did, in many cases, before they broke the
restraints of general poverty. They have reaped as they have
sown. Indeed, in the case of Japan, as Hiromitsu Ishi (1995) has
argued, the priority to human resource development applies
particularly to the early history of Japanese economic
development, beginning with the Meiji era (1868-1911), and that
radicalism in the cause of zero inflation or zero budget deficit.
does not emerge here as the appropriate reading of the demands
take note of the rationale of financial prudence alonq with
3. The "clouding" of distinct issues is seen clearly enough
in the on-going debate on balancing the budget in the united
States at this time, with occasional "shut downs" of parts of the
U.S. government. While financial conservatism must tend to
demand that a reduction of budget deficit takes place, this is
not to be confused with the "radicalism" of eliminating budget
deficits altoqether within a few years, no matter what the social
cost of this might be. There is not much of a strong inflationary
pressure in the U.S. economy at the present time, and the present
level of U.S. budget deficit - the lowest amongthe G-7 countries
- would not seem to be pressing the united States on to the edge
of what Bruno identifies as the prospects of "dynamic
instability."
36 In the context of the European union, a different and
partly political set of constraints is imposed by the agreed
criteria of deficit reduction, laid down in Maastricht, as a part
of the process of monetary union by 1999. I have tried to
discuss elsewhere (Sen 1996) the problems of using such
"criteria", which are really arbitrary rules of thumb, without
an adequate process of "social choice" involving participatory
public discussion, including the importance of unemployment
reduction (along with anti-inflationary precaution) and the need
to scrutinize different types of public expenditure (military as
well as civilian and social).
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focus has not in any way intensified - rather the reverse - as
Japan has grown richer and much more opulent.37 Development of
for orderly commerce to providing opportunities of productive
work through "enabling" social developments (such as elementary
social programmes is first and foremost an ally of the poor, public education) and favourable institutional structures (such
as land reforms). Considering the relation between markets andrather than of the rich and the affluent. Much the same lessons
emerge from the study of the other east Asian economies.3. governance is essential for reasoned assessment of public
Jourdain could escape talking prose). Whatever approach a
policies, even when the markets are to be much used.
Third, the standard indicators of success, such as the GNP
per head, leave out many aspects of development that are crucial
to the well-being and freedom of the citizens. There is a need
to examine the ends as well as the means that are implicitly
promoted in having development strategies of different kinds.
There is need for public discussion of the priorities and values
underlying policy decisions, and this includes the values that
are implicitly used in relying exclusively on GNP per head. That
7. Concludina Remarks
I shall not try to summarizethe paper, but make a few
general remarks. First, a governmentcannot avoid having a
public policy or a development strategy (any more than M.
government chooses to take reflects, in some sense, a "policy"
and a "strategy", even if it is one of doing nothing much for
anybody. Neither the idea of "public policy" nor that of
"development strategy" need be inescapably "statist" or
evaluative system puts a zero weight on other concerns such as
"militant." States do exist, and governments do some things and
longevity and the quality of life (given the value of GNP per
head), and since the connection between GNP and these human
achievements is far from tight, the result is to leave out some
abstain from others, and there is an important need to decide
what, if any thing, they should do regarding development. The
point of having a conscious development strategy is to subject
of the most basic concerns of human beings and citizens of a
the implicit choices to explicit scrutiny.
Second, there is much to scrutinize. The apparent absence
modern society. What is needed is not an alternative system of
elaborate weighting procedures that would produce another
complete ranking of all options (different from - but just as
of a development strategy is often no more than a simple reliance
on what the markets would deliver. But even the performance of
the market may crucially depend on many public policies,
beginning from the preservation of legal guarantees and support
complete as the one produced by crude indicators such as GNP
per head), but to use the social agreements that may exist or
may be generated by discussion and political participation - to
get adequate guidance for the general direction of development
n See Ishi( 1995).
3. See the papers presented at the International Conference
on Financing HumanResource Development of the Asian Development
Bank in November 1995.
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strategies. 30
be appraised in broad welfare-economic perspective. The
note has to be taken not only of the scarcity value of public
funds, but also of the lower cost of labour-intensive social
programmes at early stages of development and of the direct as
well as indirect impacts of such programmes on the life and death
of the citizens.
Fourth, the role of programmes of social development has to
framework of "human capital" provides some insight, but leaves
out others, since it treats people primarily as "means" (what
they contribute to production as "capital") rather than as "ends"
(what kind of lives they are able to live). Adam Smith had
Finally, there is much to learn from the experiences of
successes and failures of different countries, but the most
voiced some grievance, in a different but related context, about
the tendency to judge a human being by his usefulness, or - as
he put it - for "that for which we commenda chest of drawers"
important motivating issue is an interest in human life rather
than only in some indicators of commodity production and supply.
The point of explicitly discussing development strategies is to
(Smith 1790, p. 188). promote discipline in our thinking about ends and means. We
The impact of education, health care, social security, etc.,
have to be seen both in terms of their direct effects on human
capabilities and their indirect consequences on people's lives
through raising productivities and earning powers, and through
reducing the burden of high fertility and frequent childbirth.
Issues of gender equity as well as of demographic transition to
low-mortality-low-fertility societies relate closely to social
impacts of such human development, and this takes us beyond the
limited focus of instrumental concerns exclusively on the
generation of economic growth (through the use of "human
could do worse.
capital").
Fifth, the need for financial discipline and prudence is not
inimical to the broader evaluations advocated in this paper.
Social programmeshave to compete with other uses of public
resources for comparative assessment. In doing these comparisons
3. Formally, this involves relying on partial orderings
rather than complete orders, and building on partial social
agreements; on this see Sen (1970, 1985, 1995).
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